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By E. R. ARCHAMBEAU, JR.t
This note was awarded the 1960 Omar E. Garwood Memorial
Prize of $100 in a competition sponsored by the Association of Colo-
rado Claimants' Attorneys.
The daily life of the average citizen is more closely associated
with municipal governments than with the higher tiers of govern-
mental authority. The citizen's more immediate public needs are
provided by many various municipal agencies such as the police,
fire, street, water and sewage departments. If he encounters trou-
ble, he calls on the city for assistance; if he is in trouble, the city us-
ually calls upon him. In short, as far as government is concerned,
the average citizen's life revolves around the municipality in which
he lives.
This constant encountering of municipal government inevitably
leads to many conflicts resulting in a multitude of real, or imagined,
causes of action being brought by private citizens against their city.
Because of the special cloak of immunity which the law has granted
to governments, the irate citizen sometimes finds, to his dismay,
that he is "unable to get justice." This cloak of immunity confront-
ing the citizen was draped over governments as early as the 16th
Century,' and was maximized by the slogan "The king can do no
wrong.
2
Colorado is not alone in the field of municipal immunity. All
jurisdictions recognize it to varying extents.3 Colorado itself has
had well over one hundred cases at the appellate level in which the
question of municipal tort immunity-or liability-was involved.4
The purpose of this note is to examine the principal Colorado cases
on this subject and to arrange them into a semblance of categories
for a comparative evaluation.
5
GOVERNMENTAL V. CORPORATE ACTS
Colorado's first cases on the subject quickly established the
municipality's immunity for acts in its governmental capacity, and
its possible liability for negligence in its ministerial or corporate
f Mr. Archambeau is a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
1 Russell v. Devon County, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788) is reputed to be the earliest
reported case establishing this maxim.
2 Black, Low Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) says: "It does not mean that everything done by the
government is just and lawful, but that whatever is exceptionable in the conduct of public affairs is
not to be imputed to the king."
3 A leading single-volume text devoted exclusively to municipal low is Rhyne, Municipal Law
(1957). Chapter 30 of this book is devoted entirely to tort liability. Reference is made in the footnotes
in this chapter to many authoritative cases, works and law review articles covering all facets of
municipal tort liability.
4 Every reported Colorado case up through April 15, 1960, is noted herein either by a footnote or
in the text. In order to keep the note within reasonable limits, extensive use is made of the footnotes
to inform the reader what the general subject is in those cases not discussed within the text. All cases
discussed are found within the West Publ. Co. Key Number System as "Municipal Corporations, Nos.
723-857."
5 It is hoped that this original compilation of all Colorado cases will be of some small assistance
to members of the profession. Par sake of brevity, nothing is said about the usual tort defenses such
as contributory negligence and proximate cause. Most cases on any given area contain sufficient
reference to such issues to guide any attorney confronted with a municipal tort question.
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acts.6 Colorado's legal history in this field has steadily grown, with
many modifications and with some apparent cycles up to the pres-
ent time.
It has long been settled that the work of a city in building,
7
maintaining,8  and repairing
9 its buildings,10 streets,1 1  sidewalks,
12
viaducts, 13 bridges, 14 parks,15 street lights, 6 sewers, 7 dumps, 8 flood
control projects, 9 and other similar ventures,20 are purely municipal
and corporate duties. Such corporate duties or functions, therefore,
if performed negligently are not protected by governmental im-
munity.21 Obviously most contests arise from activities within the
municipality's boundaries; but liability has been found also where
the municipality was engaged in corporate functions outside of its
corporate boundary limits.
22
It will be noted that all of the above corporate duties or func-
tions are acts which have been entered into or executed by the
municipality. A distinction is made in all pertinent Colorado deci-
sions between those acts which are merely in the planning stage, or
not as yet conceived, and those acts which are either being executed
or are executed already. An early case 24  clearly pointed out this
distinction:
As long as the city authorities fail or refuse to exercise
their discretionary powers, no liability attaches; but if that
power be exercised . . . to the strict performance of what-
ever ministerial duties may be incident thereto, the city is
bound; and for any failure in that respect it cannot escape
liability.
24
6 City of Denver v. Dunsmore, 7 Colo. 328, 3 Pac. 705 (1884) (excellent discussion of common low
history); City of Denver v. Capelli, 4 Colo. 25 (1877) (the distinction must be kept steadily in mind);
Doniels v. City of Denver, 2 Colo. 669 (1875).
7 E.g., McAuliffe v. City of Victor, 15 Colo. Aop. 337, 62 Pac. 231 (1900) (dictum); McCord v. City
of Pu-blo, 5 Colo. App. 48, 36 Poc. 1109 (1894) (river levee).
SE.q., City of Sterling v. Ancioux, 112 Colo. 381, 149 P.2d 174 (1944) (ice hrzard on sidewalk
rrent-d by city's street washer); LeMarr v. City of Colorado Springs, 95 Colo. 244, 35 P.2d 497 (1934)
(call;-ion with rity street sweeper); City and County of Denver v. Mourer. 47 Colo. 209, 106 Pac. 875
(1910) (pedestrian struck by hose being usad by city street cleaners): City of Denver v. Peterson, 5
Cola. App. 41, 36 Par. 1111 (1894) (plaintiff's horsp friohtened bv city's steam roller).
9 E.a., Arps v. City and County of Denver, P? Colo. 189. 257 Pac. 1094 (19271 (alley); City and
County of Denv-r, 68 Colo. 194. 188 Pac. 728 (1920) (sidewalk); Citv and County of Denver v. Moaiv-
nay, J4 Colo. 157, 96 Pac. 1002 (1908) (sidewalk); City of Fort Collins v. Yetter, 38 Colo. 87, 89 Pac.
777 (1906) (str-t)
10 City and County of Denver v. Austria, 136 Colo. 454, 318 P.2d 1103 (1957) (fen.'. across steas
of ;#v hall); City of Colorado Springs y. Colburn, 102 Colo. 483, 81 P.2d 397 (1938) (slick floor in city
building).
11 E.g., City of Denver v. Dunsmore, 7 Cola. 328, 3 Pac. 705 (1884); McAuliffe v. City of Victor, 15
Colo. Aop. 337, 62 Pac. 231 (1900) (dictum).
12 E.g., City of Denver v. Dean, 10 Colo. 375, 16 Poc. 30 (1887); City of Denver v. Cochran, 17
Colo. App. 72, 67 Pac. 23 (1902).
13 Pueblo v. Mace, 132 Colo. 89, 284 P.2d 596 (1955); City of Pueblo v. Smith, 57 Colo. 500, 143
Pac. 281 (1914); City of Denver v. Baldasari, 15 Colo. Apa. 157, 61 Pac. 190 (1900).
14 City of Denver v. Dunsmore, 7 Colo. 328, 3 Pac. 705 (1884).
15 E.g., Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567, 129 P.2d 110 (1942) (dictum). In this juris-
diction a municipality operating a public park does so in a proprietary capacity.
16 Oliver v. City of Denver, 13 Colo. App. 345, 57 Pac. 729 (1899) (dictum).
17 E.g., City and County of Denver v. Mason, 88 Colo. 294, 295 Pac. 788 (1931) (storm sewer
backed up).
1S City of Denver v. Porter, 126 Fed. 293 (8th Cir. 1903). Compare City of Denver v. Davis, 37
Colo. 370, 86 Pac. 1027 (1906) (city-owned dump) with Esquibel v. City and County of Denver, 112
Colo. 546, 151 P.2d 757 (1944) (city property used with authority) and City and County of Denver v.
Ristau, 95 Colo. 118, 33 P.2d 387 (1934) (dump on private land).
l:t E.g., City and County of Denver v. Tolarico, 99 Colo. 178, 61 P.2d 1 (1936).
20 E.g., City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 81 Colo. 246, 254 Pac. 1000 (1927) (swimming pool).
21 See subsequent discussion in text where each of these functions is discussed more fully.
22 E.g., Mill v. City of Fort Collins, 106 Colo. 229, 104 P.2d 143 (1940) (city-owned steam shovel
working outside of city); City and County of Denver v. St. James Touring Car & Taxicab Co., 68 Colo.
203, 188 Pac. 734 (1920) (city engaged in road work on mountain road leading to city's mountain
park).
":3 City of Denver v. Copelli, 4 Colo. 25 (1877) (sewer backed up).
24 Id. at 26-27.
MAY-JUNE 1960
Other cases2 5 have rigorously adhered to this distinction.
Thus it is seen that where a municipal function is clearly min-
isterial or private, immunity is granted so long as the governmental
authorities have not yet acted. This immunity is lifted, however,
whenever the municipality does act; and it will then be held ac-
countable for its subsequent negligence.
The other side of the coin, where a function of the municipality
is clearly governmental, is best defined by considering which acts
the courts have held to be governmental in nature. Discussion of
this aspect is postponed until the conclusion of this note, for it is in




One area in which there has been much conflict is the interpre-
tation and application of the state statutes and city ordinances re-
quiring an injured citizen to comply with certain filing procedures
as a prerequisite to bringing formal complaint against a municipal
tort-feasor. Many suits, perhaps valid in all other respects, have
been summarily tossed out of court merely because the plaintiff
failed to comply with one or the other of these legislative require-
ments. Strict compliance with the proper regulation, whether it is a
state statute or a city ordinance, is the only sure way of at least
staying in court. With but one exception, 27 our appellate courts have
demanded reasonable compliance with both types of these regula-
tions.
The state, it appears, initiated the first formal notice require-
ment in 1891.28 The statute currently in effect has remained sub-
stantially the same since 1903.29 The current statute30 provides:
No action for the recovery of compensation for per-
sonal injury or death against any city ... on account of its
negligence, shall be maintained unless written notice of the
25 E.g., City and County of Denver v. Talorico, 99 Colo. 178, 61 P.2d 1 (1936) which held that in
determining the policy and character of construction work to be performed, the city is acting in its
governmental capacity, but in the performance of ministerial work, the city is liable for its negligence;
City and County of Denver v. Mason, 88 Cola. 294, 295 Pac. 788 (1931) which held there is no legal
duty upon the city to construct, but in construction and maintenance the city acts in its ministerial
capacity; City of Denver v. Dunsmore, 7 Colo. 328, 3 Pac. 705 (1884); Daniels v. City of Denver, 2
Colo. 669 (1875) (distinguished in Dunsmore, supra).
26 See text at note 171 infra.
27 See text at note 39 infra.
28 Cola. Sess. Laws 1891, § 14, pg. 382.
29 Colo. Sess. Laws 1903, ch. 175, 1 1.
30 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 139-35-1 (1953).
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time, place and cause of injury is given to the clerk.., by
the person injured, his agent or attorney, within ninety
days and the action is commenced within two years from
the occurrence of the accident ....
The notice .. . shall not be deemed invalid or insuf-
ficient solely by reason of any inaccuracy in stating the
time, place or cause of injury, if it is shown that there was
no intention to mislead and that the city council . . .was,
in fact, not misled thereby.
The City of Denver followed suit. in 189331 with a section of its
charter providing requirements much like those of the state. The
same requirements have been substantially maintained through the
years and are currently found in the Charter for the City and Coun-
ty of Denver.3 - This charter provision requires that:
Before the city and county shall be liable for damages
to any person injured upon any of the streets, avenues, al-
leys, sidewalks or other public places of the city and county,
the person so injured or someone on his behalf, shall, within
sixty days after receiving such injuries, give the mayor no-
tice, in writing of such injuries, stating fully in such notice,
when, where and how the injuries occurred and the extent
thereof.
Judging from occasional remarks in the reported cases, it would
seem that many of the other cities within the state also have adopt-
ed similar provisions in their charters or ordinances.
It is readily apparent that there are several conflicts between
the two quoted regulations. Aside from differences in the time limit
and the party to be notified, it will be noted that the state imposes
a limitation period of two years whereas Denver does not. It is of
extreme importance to note that the two-year limitation of the
statute applies to actions against the City and County of Denver for
personal injuries caused by negligence.33 This is because there is no
conflict between the two regulations in this respect. Of equal sig-
nificance are the lesser requirements for details of the accident
found in the statute as compared to those requirements in Denver's
charter. The question is when does the statute apply, and when
does the charter apply? Article XX of Colorado's Constitution pro-
vides that charters and ordinances of municipalities dealing with
local and municipal matters shall supersede any state law in con-
flict with such charters and ordinances34 The city regulations,
therefore, govern the notice requirements, but only when they are
in conflict with the statutory requirements. If there is no conflict,
either the city or the state requirements may apply depending upon
the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
Obviously the Denver charter provisions apply only within its
corporate boundaries. But how inclusive is the phrase "or other
public places of the city and county"? In a personal injury suit in-
volving an accident within the Denver municipal auditorium, the
Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the auditorium was not within
the scope of such public places.3 5 The court, in applying the usual
31 City of Denver Charter art. IX, 1 9 (1893).
32 City and County of Denver Charter art. VIII, § 158.
33 Dahlin v. City and County of Denver, 97 Colo. 239, 48 P.2d 1013 (1935).
34 Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6.
55 City and County of Denver v. Taylor, 88 Colo. 89, 292 Pac. 594 (1930).
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rules of statutory interpretation, thought that the legislative intent
was to include only such other public, places of the same generic
class as streets, avenues, alleys and sidewalks. This holding is fol-
lowed, at least by implication, in City of Colorado Springs v. Col-
burn,36 where a personal injury action was filed under the state
statute even though the accident occurred in the business office of
the municipally-owned power company.
This interpretation of "public places" was again reinforced in
Horst v. City and County of Denver, 7 where the plaintiff was in-
jured while standing on the front steps of her home adjacent to the
sidewalk. This case also demonstrates the interrelation of the state
statutory provisions and those of the charter where the two are not
in conflict. The plaintiff contended that she had not filed the re-
quired notice since the accident had been in a private place, but
that the city ordinance without any limitation clause pre-empted
all application of the statute within the city limits. The city suc-
cessfully argued that the two-year limitations clause of the state
statute was applicable. The court held that the statute was not in
conflict with the charter provisions, and was therefore applicable,
because the charter did not encompass those accidents occurring
upon private property.3
8
As mentioned above, with but one exception, the courts have
required that the plaintiff's notice fully comply with all of the pro-
visions of the particular regulation in question. The court in City
36 102 Colo. 483, 81 P.2d 397 (1938).
37 101 Colo. 284, 73 P.2d 388 (1937).
3 Accord, Dahlin v. City and County of Denver, 97 Colo. 239, 48 P.2d 1013 (1935) (constitutionality
of state statute upheld). The constitutionality of notice requirements was also upheld in Cunningham v.







of Colorado Springs v. Colburn 9 felt that the plaintiff had a meri-
torious defense for failing to file notice within the statutory period.
Despite the provisions of the statute expressly requiring that the
injured party or his agent or attorney notify the city clerk within
ninety days of such accident, the court dwelled at considerable
length upon the suffering which the plaintiff had endured, and then
concluded that the plaintiff had been so shaken that she was unable
to think clearly so as to protect her rights. The court did not even
discuss the possibility that the plaintiff could have engaged another
person to submit the notice for her. In disposing of the case in favor
of the plaintiff, the court said:
While respectable authority has held that under sta-
tutes similar to ours, a failure to give the required notice to
the city within the statutory time fixed cannot be excused,
and that the statute must be strictly construed, we are in-
clined to adopt what we conceive to be the more reason-
able and humane rule . . . to the effect that under proper
circumstances of mental and physical incapacity, giving of
notice is excused, the question as to the sufficiency . . . to
be submitted to the jury .... 40
Despite the holding in Colburn, the court has held many times
that compliance with the conditions imposed by the statute or
municipal regulation is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a legal
action against the municipality involved. 41 It is of interest that the
Colburn case is not cited for this principle in any of the subsequent
Colorado cases involving sufficiency of notice in a tort action
against a municipality.
Lee v. City of Fort Morgan,42 although filed correctly as a
wrongful-death action, was dismissed for plaintiff's failure to file
any notice as required by the state statute. Similarly, another case
43
was dismissed when it was found that although the plaintiff had
fully complied with the requirements of a new notice statute, it had
been only recently enacted by the legislature and was not to be-
come effective until the month following the accident.4 4 It is also
a possible cause for dismissal where, although proper notice of an
accident is filed with one city official, the regulation requires that
a different officer be notified.
4 5
Two close cases are of particular interest. The plaintiff, in City
of Canon City v. Cox,4 6 instead of filing a notice with the city clerk
as required by statute, had served the mayor with a summons to
39 102 Colo. 483, 81 P.2d 397 (1938).
40 Id. at 486, 81 P.2d at 398.
41 E.g., Baker v. Town of Manitou, Colo., 277 Fed. 232 (8th Cir. 1921) (minors not exempt from
requirements); Armijo v. City and County of Denver, 123 Colo. 304, 228 P.2d 989 (1951); Fisher v.
City and County of Denver, 123 Colo. 158, 165, 225 P.2d 828, 830 (1950); Peek v. City of Lamar, 87
Colo. 107, 285 Pac. 168 (1930).
42 77 Colo. 135, 235 Pac. 348 (1925) where, by way of dictum, The court said that if an injured
party died after the 90-day period had expired, the injury being continuous, the notice period would
not begin to run until the date of death.
43 City of Colorado Springs v. Neville, 42 Colo. 219, 93 Pac. 1096 (1908). The earlier act required
a description of the extent of injuries and that the notice be filed with the mayor; whereas the new
act was to require filing with the city clerk, but did not require a description of the injuries.
44 See also Peek v. City of Lamar, 87 Colo. 107, 285 Pac. 168 (1930) where oral notice was
promptly given, but written notice was not filed until the 90-day period had elapsed.
45 Fisher v. City and County of Denver, 123 Colo. 158, 225 P.2d 828 (1950) (filed with city clerk
instead of with mayor as required) where it was said that the mayor cannot delegate another as his
agent for service; City of Denver v. Saulcey, 5 Colo. App. 420, 38 Pac. 1098 (1895) (filed with alder-
man) where the court, in dictum, said they might not have reversed judgment for the plaintiff had the
jury been instructed on this point and had the jury then found that the city had been notified in fact.
40 55 Colo. 264, 133 Pac. 1040 (1913).
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which was attached a copy of the complaint with all details therein.
The apparent turning point of the case was that the court felt there
had been sufficient compliance with the statute since the mayor had
promptly notified the city council and city clerk at an official town
meeting, and that the complaint had fully described the accident.
Powers v. City of Boulder 7 involved the question of whether the
mayor could waive the statutory requirement. The mayor had told
the plaintiff that he would accept the notice for and in behalf of
the city, and that it was not necessary for it to be given to the city
clerk as required by statute. The court, by a 4-3 decision, reversed in
favor of the plaintiff and remanded the cause for a new trial. The
dessenting faction of the court staunchly protested on the grounds
that the court could not legally excuse the statute's requirements,
and, that in so doing, the majority members of the court were an-
nulling legislation.
48
The general import of most decisions concerning notice require-
ments is that the details of the accident must be given so that the
city officials may be advised of the injury so they may investigate
the accident promptly while evidence still may be easily acquired.49
The extent of injuries sustained must be given in the notice"' as
well as the cause of the accident.51  Location of the accident scene
must be accurately given, too.
5 2
It should be noted in passing that the City and County of Den-
ver presently has an ordinance-' which provides for notice to be
given in complaints dealing with damage to property. This ordin-
ance, for all practical purposes, is identical to the charter provision 4
dealing with personal injuries. No reported case was found which
dealt with property damage and this ordinance provision; but it
would seem that all that has been said about the personal injury
notice requirements will apply with equal force in property dam-
age suits.
SIDEWALKS AND STREETS
Without question, the majority of reported Colorado cases in-
volving municipal tort liability have been connected in some way
47 54 Colo. 558, 131 Pac. 395 (1913).
48 This case should be carefully compared with Fisher v. City and Count' of Denver, 123 Colo.
158, 225 P.2d 828 (1950) (judgment for city) in which Powers was distinguished.
49 E.g., Fisher v. City and County of Denver, supro note 48; City and County of Denver v. Perkins,
50 Colo. 159, 114 Poc. 484 (1911); City and County of Denver v. Bacon, 44 Colo. 166, 96 Pac. 974
(1908); City of Denver v. Bradbury, 19 Colo. App. 441, 75 Pac. 1077 (1904).
50 City of Denver v. Barron, 6 Colo. App. 72, 39 Pc. 989 (1895) which was reversed in favor of
the city because the notice had merely said internal injuries, but the trial court erroneously admitted
evidence showing that the plaintiff had suffered a miscarriage.
51 Beezley v. Olson, 129 Colo. 406, 270 P.2d 758 (1954) was dismissed on other grounds although
the court chose to ignore the discrepancy in the plaintiff's notice which gave the cause of the accident
as an icy sidewalk, whereas at the trial the plaintiff alleged that the sidewalk itself had been finished
too smoothly; City and County of Denver v. Bacon, 44 Colo. 166, 96 Pac. 974 (1908) where "torn up
and impassable condition of sidewalk" was held to sufficiently describe the cause of the accident;
Stoors v. City of Denver, 19 Colo. App. 159, 73 Pac. 1094 (1903) where judgment for the city was
affirmed because the plaintiff's notice failed to state that ice upon the sidewalk was the cause of
the accident.
52 City of Cripple Creek v. Loveless, 70 Colo. 482, 202 Pac. 705 (1921) where it was held sufficient
that the notice stated only that the accident had occurred between two certain cross streets on one
side of a given street; City and County of Denver v. Perkins, 50 Cola. 159, 114 Pac. 484 (1911) where
the notice was held to be sufficient although it had specified the site to be an excavation for curbing
but failed to say which side of the street. The court hints, however, that the notice might hove been
insufficient had there been an excavation on both sides of the street; City of Pueblo v. Babbitt, 47
Colo. 596, 108 Pac. 175 (1910) where the notice was held to be sufficient although it had mistakenly
said that the accident had been one block away from the true site, the court felt that the statute
provision pertaining to inaccuracies was controlling when it was shown that the plaintiff's attorney
had promptly notified the city attorney of thi error and that the city officials had then inspected the
true scene.
53 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code § 191.1 (1959).
54 City and County of Denver Charter art. VIII, I 158.
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with a defect or obstacle on a sidewalk or street.55 It is no longer a
question in Colorado as to what the respective duties of the munici-
pality and its citizens are with respect to the streets and sidewalks.
City of Boulder v. Niles56 has often been cited for the following
proposition:
It may be said, generally, that the duty imposed upon
municipal corporations in respect to its [sic] sidewalks is
a duty to keep them in a reasonably safe condition. Upon
persons using the sidewalks the duty imposed is that of or-
dinary care. Under conditions of increased danger, there
is imposed a duty of increased care. These are general
principles to be understood and applied in the light of the
circumstances of each particular case.57
The same doctrine has been applied to streets as well.58  The city,
however, is not an insurer and is required only to keep its streets5 9
and sidewalks6 ° in a reasonably safe condition. Once a defect has
been brought to the attention of the city, it is its duty to repair the
defect within a reasonable time. The duty is applicable to defects in
streets 61 as well as sidewalks.62 This duty of repair is placed upon
the city and cannot be avoided, suspended, or delegated.
6 3
Three basic issues may arise in any case involving a defective
thoroughfare. These are: (1) the question of whether the city knew,
or should have known, of the existence of the defect; (2) whether
the defect complained of was one sufficiently hazardous to properly
subject the city to liability; and (3) the correlative duties and re-
55 Of the 149 Colorado cases noted herein, 32 involved defective streets, and 67 involved defective
sidewalks.
569 Colo. 415, 12 Pac. 632 (1886).
57 Id. at 419, 12 Poc. at 634. Accord, Griffith v. City and County of Denver, 55 Colo. 37, 132
Pac. 57 (1913); City of Denver v. Williams, 12 Colo. 475, 21 Pac. 617 (1889). See also City of Colorado
Springs v. May, 20 Colo. App. 204, 77 Pac. 1093 (1904) (city employees must use reasonable care).
58 City of Pueblo v. Smith, 57 Colo. 500, 143 Pac. 281 (1914). Accord, Pueblo v. Mace, 132 Colo.
89, 284 P.2d 596 (1955); City and County of Denver v. St. James Touring Car & Taxicab Co., 68 Colo.
203, 188 Pac. 734 (1920); Koch v. City and County of Denver, 24 Colo. App. 406, 133 Pac. 1119 (1913);
City of Denver v. Baldasari, 15 Colo. App. 157, 61 Pac. 190 (1900); City of Pueblo v. Smith, 3 Colo.
App. 386, 33 Pac. 685 (1893).
59 E.g., City of Pueblo v. Smith, 57 Colo. 500, 143 Poc. 281 (1914); City of Denver v. Moewes, 15
Colo. App. 28, 60 Pac. 986 (1900). See also Kling v. City and County of Denver, 335 P.2d 876 (Colo.
1959) where the city was not held liable for a street defect which allegedly caused the breaking of
the steering mechanism of the plaintiff's twenty year-old car.
60 E.g., Beck v. City and County of Denver, 95 Colo. 46, 32 P.2d 261 (1934); Garbanati v. City of
Durango, 30 Colo. 358, 70 Pac. 686 (1902); City of Denver v. Hyatt, 28 Colo. 129, 63 Poc. 403 (1900).
By inference should be added Johnson v. City and County of Denver, 135 Colo. 365, 311 P.2d 708
(1957) (judgment for city but no facts given about accident).
61 E.g., City of Denver v. Moewes, 15 Colo. App. 28, 60 Pac. 986 (1900) (nat required to repair
promptly).
62 E.g., Elliott v. Field, 21 Colo. 378, 41 Pac. 504 (1895); City of Boulder v. Weger, 17 Colo. App.
69, 66 Pac. 1070 (1902).
63 City of Denver v. Aaron, 6 Colo. App. 232, 40 Pac. 587 (1895).
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sponsibilities of the city, of abutting property owners, and of the
person injured by the defect. Omitting the questions of compliance
with the regulatory notice requirements previously discussed, it
may be said that in general, suits involving defective thoroughfares
are fought on battle lines drawn around any or all of these three
issues.
The issue of whether the municipality knew, or should have
known, of the defect which is the subject of litigation has confront-
ed the courts many times. It is a basic tenet in Colorado that the
plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant-city had either
actual or constructive notice of the existence of the alleged defect.
This requirement of actual or constructive notice is noted in City
and County of Denver v. Magivney,6 4 where it was said:
When a defect in the sidewalk causing accident and in-
jury was the result of the city's own negligent act, a
primary liability against the city attaches therefrom. But,
when such defective condition of the sidewalk results from
the negligent act of another, no liability attaches against
the municipality in the first instance. In order to hold the
city responsible in damages for injuries suffered thereby,
plaintiff must prove that the city had actual or constructive
notice of the defective condition for a sufficient length of
time before the accident to have cured the defect.6 5
The question of notice must be carefully analysed. It appears
that the problem of notice of defects in city-owned thoroughfares is
divided into notice of those defects caused by others than the city,
and notice of those defects not so caused. The above quotation from
Magivney must be considered to require actual or constructive no-
tice of the defect by the city in any event. This is borne out by all
decisions concerning the question, particularly those holding that a
city is not an insurer.66 Where a defect not created by others is
shown to have existed for a reasonable period in a city thoroughfare,
and it is one which could have been detected by the reasonable
diligence of the municipality, it is presumed to have constructive
notice of that defect.6 7  It has also been expressed that notice or
knowledge of an obvious hazard is itself negligence per se.68
It is equally well established that constructive notice will be
imputed to the city where by the exercise of ordinary care, the city
should have anticipated defects which are to be normally expected
under the circumstances.6 9 Constructive knowledge will also be
64 44 Colo. 157, 96 Poc. 1002 (1908).
65 Id. at 161, 96 Pac. at 1004. Accord, Wold v. City of Boulder, 91 Colo. 44, 9 P.2d 931 (1932);
City of La Junta v. Burns, 46 Colo. 436, 104 Poc. 941 (1909) (notice of defect must be alleaed and set
forth in complaint); City of Denv-r v. Williams, 12 Colo. 475, 21 Pac. 617 (1889); City of Denver v.
Dean, 10 Colo. 375, 16 Pac. 30 (1887) (leading case). Compare City and County of Denver v. Farmer,
125 Colo. 462, 244 P.2d 1086 (1952) discussed in text at note 109 infra.
66 Cases cited in notes 59 and 60 supro. Accord, Cunningham v. City of Denver, 23 Colo. 18, 45
Pc. 356 (1896).
67 City of Denver v. Hyatt, 28 Colo. 129, 63 Pac. 403 (1900) (large hole in board wclk). Cf., City
of Fort Collins v. Roten, 72 Colo. 182, 210 Pac. 326 (1922) (defective slide in city park).
68 City of Pueblo v. Smith, 3 Colo. App. 386, 33 Pac. 685 (1893) (post protruding 27.inches above
surface of street). Compare Thunborg v. City of Pueblo, 45 Colo. 337, 101 Pac. 399 (1909), affirming
18 Colo. App. 80, 70 Pac. 148 (1902) (fire plug hidden in weeds alongside street). Other cases con-
cerned with similar defects are: Pueblo v. Ratliff, 137 Colo. 468, 327 P.2d 270 (1958) where plaintiff
failed to establish constructive notice since a hole dug in the street by others was periodically refilled
as the dirt settled; Beck v. City and County of Denver, 95 Colo. 46, 32 P.2d 261 (1934) (facts did not
establish the alleged negligence per se of the city).
69 E.g., City of Sterling v. Ancioux, 112 Colo. 381, 149 P.2d 174 (1944) where the city was held to
have constructive notice of a hazord created by a city employee; City of Denver v. Dean, 10 Colo.
375, 16 Pac. 30 (1887).
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found where it is shown that the city has had the means of knowl-
edg4 of such defects for a sufficient time to have corrected the de-
fect. The "means of knowledge" principle, however, is limited to
those defects which are visible or which naturally arise from nor-
mal usage or natural climatic conditions. 0
The question of whether evidence is properly admissible to
show that the city should be charged with constructive or actual
notice sometimes becomes complicated. Generally-accepted rules of
evidence play as vital a part here as in any trial proceeding. It was
shown in the previous discussion of statutory notice that the plain-
tiff's notice to the municipality must accurately describe the loca-
tion and nature of the alleged defect.7 1 Obviously, testimony must
be introduced in the resulting trial in order to substantiate the
plaintiff's claim of the existence of the defect. It has been held that
evidence showing only that the board walks of the city were gen-
erally in a defective condition is not sufficient to establish the ex-
istence of the particular defect alleged; nor does it serve to charge
the municipality with notice of that defect.72 It, however, is permis-
sible to establish notice to the municipality where it is shown that
defects similar to the one complained of were commonly found in
the immediate vicinity of the accident. 73 Similarly, testimony show-
ing that municipal employees frequently worked in the immediate
area of the accident scene has been admitted as evidence of notice.
7 4
One of the most disputed points has been whether evidence of
previous accidents to others at the same location is admissible.75
One line of cases follows the reasoning that such evidence is inad-
missible since the introduction of this evidence would present in-
numerable collateral issues.7 6 Other cases have permitted evidence
of previous accidents where it is offered for the purpose of showing
that a dangerous situation existed and the city thereby had had
constructive notice. 77 It should be noted that in those cases per-
mitting this testimony, one of the issues involved was whether the
municipality had had notice. In those cases rejecting this evidence,
the matter of notice was either not in issue or the city had admitted
having notice.
It is generally accepted that mere proof that a tort-feasor has
subsequently repaired a defect is inadmissible to pr6ve the negli-
gence of the defendant.78  Introduction of such evidence, however,
has been permitted where the jury had viewed the scene of the ac-
cident.79 One case, involving an accident caused by the plaintiff's
70 City of Denver v. Dean, supro note 69. Accord, City and County of Denver v. Caton, 108 Col o .
170, 114 P.2d 553 (1941); City of Lo Junto v. Burns, 46 Colo. 436, 104 Pac. 941 (1909); City of Denver
v. Hyatt, 28 Colo. 129, 63 Pac. 403 (1900); City of Denver v. Williams, 12 Colo. 475, 21 Poc. 617
(1889).
71 See text at note 51 supro.
72 City of Boulder v. Weger, 17 Colo. App. 69, 66 Pac. 1070 (1902).
73 Town of Colorado City v. Smith, 17 Colo. App. 172, 67 Pac. 909 (1902).
74 City of Colorado Springs v. Oehschloger, 137 Colo. 147, 322 P.2d 108 (1958).
75 See generally 2 Wigmore, Evidence 1 252 (3d ed. 1940).
76 Griffith v. City and County of Denver, 55 Colo. 37, 132 Pac. 57 (1913) (extra-smooth sidewalk);
Diamond Rubber Co. v. Harrymon, 41 Colo. 415, 92 Pac. 922 (1907) (pipe protruding out of sidewalk)
in which the court distinguished City of Denver v. Hyatt, 28 Colo. 129, 63 Pac. 403 (1900) on the
grounds that the defect in Hyatt was plainly visible for such a period of time as to create o presump-
tion of notice to the city. It should be noted that in Hyatt the evidence was only as to the absence of
a street light and was not concerned of all with previous accidents.
77 City and County of Denver v. Brubaker, 97 Colo. 501, 51 P.2d 352 (1935); Town of Meeker v.
Fairfield, 25 Colo. App. 187, 136 Pac. 471 (1913).
78 Griffith v. City and County of Denver, 55 Colo. 37, 132 Pac. 57 (1913); Diamond Rubber Co. v.
Harryman, 41 Colo. 415, 92 Pac. 922 (1907); Town of Meeker v. Fairfield, supra note 77; 2 Wigmore,
Evidence 1 283 (3d ed. 1940).
79 City of Fort Collins v. Roten, 72 Colo. 182, 210 Pac. 326 (1922).
DICTA
MAY-JUNE 1960
horse being frightened by a steam roller, permitted introduction of
evidence that other horses passing by had also been frightened by
the steam roller.80 Evidence showing that an undedicated street was
widely used by the public and that the municipal authorities had
voluntarily assumed the maintenance of it was held to be prima
facie evidence that the street was in fact a public thoroughfare. 81
Evidence has also been admitted for the purpose of showing the
surrounding conditions at the time of the accident.8 2
Assuming that all other problems have been resolved, the de-
fect itself must be examined. It is not every defect in a sidewalk 3
or a street 84 that is actionable. In Nelson v. City and County of Den-
ver, 5 it was said:
A defect in a street or sidewalk, to be actionable, must
be such that a reasonably prudent person would anticipate
danger from its existence .... Sometimes this is a question
for the jury ... and sometimes the defect is such that, as a
matter of law, it is not actionable .... Each case must be
determined on the facts in evidence.8 6
Little difficulty has been had in determining that an unmarked
and unguarded excavation in a thoroughfare is actionable as a mat-
ter of course,8 7 even when they are to one side of the thoroughfare. 8
Excavations immediately adjacent to a thoroughfare also have been
found actionable since it may reasonably be expected that a user of
the thoroughfare might deviate a slight amount from the beaten
track.8 9 Obstructions, such as piles of sand in the street,90 posts pro-
truding well out of the surface of the street,91 or park benches on
the sidewalk, 92 are given much the same treatment by the courts.
The more common accidents, such as tripping over slight obstruc-
tions or small holes, are much more difficult to segregate into def-
inite categories of liability or non-liability. Each set of circum-
stances must be analysed, and only general statements may be made
in this area.
These more common types of accidents have posed quite a prob-
lem in Colorado municipal liability suits. Much, if not all, of the
problem in this area has been created by the courts themselves in
attempting arbitrarily to set a fixed dimension for determining
whether a given unevenness is actionable as a matter of law.
0 City of Boulder -. Stewordson, 67 Colo. 582, 189 Pac. 1 (1920), reversing 26 Colo. App. 290, 143
Pac. 820 (1914).
81 Town of Salida v. McKinno, 16 Colo. 523, 27 Pac. 810 (1891).
82 City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 81 Colo. 246, 254 Pac. 1000 (1927) (coldness of water in swim-
ming pool); City of Denver v. Hyatt, 28 Colo. 129, 63 Pac. 403 (1900) (absence of light at accident
scene).
S3 E.g., City of Denver v. Hyatt, supro note 82.
84 E.o., City of Denver v. Maoewes, 15 Colo. App. 28, 60 Pac. 986 (1900).
85 109 Colo. 113, 122 P.2d 252 (1942).
86 Id. at 118, 122 P.2d at 254.
87 Elliott v. Field, 21 Colo. 378, 41 Pac. 504 (1895). Compare City of Colorado City v. Hunt, 56
Colo. 336, 138 Poc. 24 (1914) whEre plaintiff was found guilty of contributory negligence in assuming
the risk of jumping an excavation.
88 City of Fort Collins v. Yetter, 38 Colo. 87, 89 Pac. 777 (1906). Accord, Restatement, Torts I 368
(1934). Compare Town of Lyons v. Watt, 43 Colo. 238, 95 Pac. 949 (1908).
89 City of Boulder v. Burns, 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712 (1957); City of Denver v. Hamilton, 8 Colo.
App. 392, 46 Pac. 1115 (1896); City of Denver v. Johnson, 8 Colo. App. 384, 46 Pac. 621 (1896); City
of Denver v. Solomon, 2 Colo. App. 534, 31 Pac. 507 (1892). Accord, Restatement, Torts § 368 (1934).
Compcre Town of Lyons v. Watt, supra note 88.
90 Arps v. City and County of Denver, 82 Colo. 189, 257 Pac. 1094 (1927). Accord, City of Denver
v. Murray, 18 Colo. App. 142, 70 Pac. 440 (1902) (wooden derrick in street).
91 City of Pueblo v. Smith, 3 Colo. App. 386, 53 Pac. 685 (1893). Compare Thunborg v. City of
Pueblo, 45 Colo. 337, 101 Pac. 399 (1909), affirming 18 Colo. App. 80, 70 Pac. 148 (1902).
92 Higgins v. City of Boulder, 105 Cola. 395, 98 P.2d 996 (1940). Accord, City and County of Denver
v. Austria, 136 Colo. 454, 318 P.2d 1103 (1957) (fence across steps of city hall).
DICTA
MAY-JUNE 1960
The move toward fixing an arbitrary dimension, which in itself
would determine whether a given defect was actionable as a mat-
ter of law, apparently began in an early case 3 involving a hole, per-
haps two to three inches deep, in the top layer of planking on a via-
duct. The plaintiff was successful in recovering for damages in-
curred when his horse stepped into this hole. The court voiced the
opinion that allowing such a defect to remain unrepaired was not
reasonable performance of the city's duty to keep its streets in a
usable condition. Several years later, the court reversed, with di-
rections to dismiss, a case 94 involving an unevenness of only one-
fourth to three-fourths of an inch in the planks of a viaduct. The
court felt that much a trivial defect did not show unreasonable per-
formance of the city's responsibilities. These decisions were fol-
lowed in City and Conuty of Denver v. Hatter,9" which set the stage
93 City of Denver v. Boldosori, 15 Colo. App. 157, 61 Poc. 190 (1900).
94 City of Pueblo v. Smith, 57 Colo. 500, 143 Poc. 281 (1914).













by affirming judgment for the plaintiff who had tripped over a side-
walk flagstone which was approximately 11/4 inches to 2 -inches
higher than the ground in front of it. The court readily distin-
guished Hatter from Smith by saying that in Smith the defect com-
plained of had been one-fourth to three-fourths of an inch high;
whereas in Hatter, not only was the defect much more pronounced,
but also it was in a pedestrian walkway.
More fuel for the fire was added a short time after Hatter.
Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed with directions to dismiss
in a similar case96 when it was shown that the protrusion had been
only 1%-inches high. The court distinguished the case with Hatter
on the basis of the difference in height of the protrusions; and then
cited two cases97 from other jurisdictions holding that an inequality
of two inches or less was not, as a matter of law, an actionable de-
fect. A second case 98 immediately followed the Burrows case in
which the alleged defect had been "perhaps two inches." In revers-
ing, the court cited Burrows. The die was now cast. Colorado had
decreed that a defect of less than "perhaps two inches" was not suf-
ficient alone, as a matter of law, to charge a municipality with neg-
ligence. Burrows was cited again in a case99 where the plaintiff
had tripped over some nails protruding only three-fourths of an
inch from a board walk.
Signs that the court might weaken in this matter of dimensional
analysis first appeared in Nelson v. City and County of Denver.100
The plaintiff's notice to the city had stated that his fall upon a city
sidewalk had been caused by an uplifted slab raised "approximately
two inches" above the adjacent slab. The formal complaint, among
other things, alleged that the defective slab was raised three inches.
The trial court granted a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint did not agree with the plaintiff's written notice. The su-
preme court, by a 4-3 decision, reversed the dismissal and remand-
ed the cause for new trial. Speaking of the Burrows case, the court
said: "True, in that case we said: 'An inequality of two inches or
less had been held, as a matter of law, not to render it not reason-
ably safe for public travel.'"'o But, the court continued,
We did not hold ... that we would follow cases further
than as to an inequality of one and three-eights inches.
Furthermore, in that case we were speaking in the light of
the evidence as to all the facts and circumstances of the
case. . . . The general and, as we think, the controlling,
principle in such cases is . . . "Mere irregularity and in-
equality of the surface of a way does not of itself make a
city liable for damages sustained at such a place."... Some-
times this is a question for the jury . . . and sometimes the
defect is such that as a matter of law, it is not action-
able .... 102
96 City and County of Denver v. Burrows, 76 Colo. 17, 227 Pac. 840 (1924).
97 Northrup v. City of Pontiac, 159 Mich. 250, 123 N.W. 1107 (1909) (grating projected two inches
above sidewalk); Beltz v. City of Yonkers, 148 N.Y. 67, 42 N.E. 401 (1895) (21/2-inch gap between
flagstones in sidewalk).
98 City of Colorado Springs v. Phillips, 76 Colo. 257, 230 Pac. 617 (1924) (plaintiff died shortly
afterwards as a result).
99 Beck v. City and County of Denver, 95 Colo. 46, 32 P.2d 261 (1934).
100 109 Colo. 113, 122 P.2d 252 (1942).
101 Id. at 117, 122 P.2d at 254.
.02 Id. at 118, 122 P.2d at 254.
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The court, before discussing how incongruous it was to apply the
same rule to defects in front of a home for the aged and to those in
the warehouse district, laid the foundation by saying:
With the principle thus announced in mind, we think
it an unreasonable construction of the opinion [Burrows]
to say that it lays down the proposition that, whether per-
mitting an inequality or raised block in a sidewalk, con-
stitutes actionable negligence may be determined simply
with a foot rule.
1 °0
The case is not authority for such a proposition. 10 4 Parker v.
City and County of Denver'0 5 completely squelched the earlier cases
relying upon a fixed dimension. With a fine touch of veiled humor,
the court, in discussing the difference of five-eighths of an inch in
Burrows and Phillips, said that if five-eights of an inch had made
no difference, there would be no reason why the next case involving
a protrusion of only five-eights of an inch higher would not also be
held not actionable as a matter of law. The court felt that a con-
tinued progressive raising of the standard would finally result in
holding that there was no such thing as an actionable defect. The
court, in overruling Burrows and Phillips, established a more prac-
tical rule by saying:
[T] he extent of the depression or elevation in a street
which will relieve the city of actionable negligence in its
maintenance must vary with other circumstances .... The
other circumstances which must be taken into consideration
in all of these cases is the amount of travel on the sidewalk,
the location of the depression or elevation, the nature of the
area, and other circumstances which may properly be con-
sidered by a jury in the determination of the case.'06
Mr. Justice Holland, the lone dissenter, felt that the cities needed
the preservation of the Burrows rule for security in being able to
determine what was an actionable defect. Abandoning the previous
rule, he felt, would result in the cities being placed in the position
of being an insurer of all persons using the streets and sidewalks.
In the light of the "sidewalk" cases just discussed, it is some-
what puzzling to compare those cases with the cases involving a
fall into a manhole with a defective cover.10 7
Three cases, all within the last eight years, involving somewhat
similar circumstances have presented an apparent conflict between
two of these and with the sidewalk cases as well. In City of Boulder
v. Burns1 8 the plaintiff was injured when she stepped onto a defec-
tive meter pit cover which tipped and dropped her into the pit. Al-
though the pit was outside of the city limits, the city had installed
and maintained it for the purpose of supplying water to rural users.
At the scene of the accident there were no sidewalks, but the pit
was located along the roadside where pedestrians habitually walked.
The court held that although the city had no duty to maintain a safe
103 Ibid.
104 Id. at 118-19, 122 P.2d at 254.
105 128 Colo. 355, 262 P.2d 553 (1953).
106 Id. at 360, 262 P.2d at 555. Accord, City of Colorado Springs v. Oehschlager, 137 Colo. 147,
322 P.2d 108 (1958) (there is usually a "shadow zone").
107 The earliest case involving such an accident was City of Denver v. Dean, 10 Colo. 375, 16 Pac.
30 (1887). Dean should be compared with Peek v. City of Lamar, 87 Colo. 87, 285 Pac. 168 (1930) and
City and County of Denver v. Magivney, 44 Colo. 157, 36 Pac. 1002 (1908).
1t' 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712 (1957).
DICTA
MAY-JUNE 1960
walkway outside of the city limits, the ciy was negligent for placing
a dangerous pitfall in a public passageway.
City and County of Denver v. Farmer'019 involved an injury suf-
fered by an elderly man when, in walking a few feet from a regu-
larly-used bus stop to the nearby sidewalk, he stepped on a faulty
manhole cover in the city-maintained parkway between the curb
and walk. As in Burns, the cover tipped, and the elderly gentleman
broke his leg in the resulting fall into the manhole. The court, in
reversing judgment for the plaintiff with directions to dismiss, said
that despite the fact the parkway was technically part of the street,
it was not to be considered a part of the sidewalk to be maintained
in safe condition for pedestrians.
[T] herefore, the degree of care relative to the so-called
park area is of a lower standard than that required in the
construction and maintenance of the streets and sidewalks
proper. The duty resting on the city looks toward the safe-
ty of those who are expected to use the streets and side-
walks, and that degree of safety does not extend to a park-
way which is not expected to be used by pedestrians. The
pedestrian has no right to expect the ordinary area between
the sidewalks and the curb stone to be in as safe condition
as the sidewalk, and to place any such burden on the city
is unreasonable. 1 0
The court then cited dictum from an earlier case"' for the proposi-
tion that a pedestrian has no right to assume that the way from the
sidewalk to the street was smooth. Of special interest are the words
used in Burns as it distinguished that case from Farmer. In Burns,
21
2
the court, in speaking of Farmer, said that there the plaintiff in
"avoiding" the sidewalk was a trespasser on the parkway, and there
was no duty on the part of anyone to keep the parkway in a safe
condition for pedestrians.
113
This amazing statement designating one walking on a parkway
as a trespasser is even more startling when compared with City and
County of Denver v. Stutzman.14 In Stutzman the court specifically
approved an instruction given to the trial jury that people have the
right to go onto public property without invitation; and that although
the city has no obligation to keep that property safe for everyone,
the city is liable if it negligently constructs and maintains a danger-
ous condition which cannot be seen unless the city has warned those
109 125 Colo. 462, 244 P.2d 1086 (1952).
110 Id. at 465-66, 244 P.2d at 1088. This statement should be compared with the language in City
and County of Denver v. Forster, 89 Colo. 246, 1 P.2d 922 (1931) (plaintiff tripped over safety zone
marker) and in City of Colorado Springs v. Floyd, 19 Colo. App. 167, 73 P.2d 1092 (1903) where a
leaky fire plug had created an ice hazard in the street between a street car stop and the street.
Contra, Restatement, Torts § 367 (1934).
111 Oliver v. City of Denver, 13 Colo. App. 345, 57 Pac. 729 (1899) where the plaintiff tripped over
a railing adjacent to the sidewalk and sued the city for its negligence in failing to provide street lights
and in permitting the railing to be installed.
112 City of Boulder v. Burns, 135 Cola. 561, 566, 313 P.2d 712, 715 (1957).
113 Contra, City of Denver v. Stein, 25 Colo. 125, 53 Pac. 283 (1898) where the city was held liable
for placing a small pipe protruding three inches from the ground between the curb and the sidewalk;
Restatement, Torts 1 335 (1934).
114 95 Colo. 165, 33 P.2d 1071 (1934) where the plaintiff's daughter drowned while wading in city-
owned river.
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who habitually use that property. Unfortunately Stutzman appar-
ently was not considered by the court in Farmer.
Aikens v. George W. Clayton Trust Comm'nn1 5 briefly reaf-
firmed Farmer when Mr. Justice Holland said, "The hole being in
the parkway, which is not designed for pedestrian use, the matter
of the city's liability in such instances is settled .... 1,6 This is the
apparent position currently in effect in Colorado.The "icy sidewalk" cases are little different in most respects
from the "sidewalk" cases already discussed. Most of the previously-
discussed principles, e.g., statutory notice, actual or constructive no-
tice, are equally applicable. Questions pertaining to the responsi-
bilities and duties of the municipality, of abutting property owners,
and of pedestrians are applicable to all thoroughfare cases. Many
of the "icy sidewalk" cases, however, point out these multiple col-
lateral duties with more definiteness than in the usual "sidewalk"
cases.
Referring again to the previously-given quotation1 7 from Ma-
givney, n8 it is well established that the city is primarily liable for
hazards created by its own negligence or by natural causes;11 9 but
when a hazard is created by an artificial cause, 120 the city, as well
as the abutting property owner responsibile for the artificial hazard,
are jointly liable."' The municipality must, however, be shown to
have had actual or constructive notice of the hazard for a sufficient
period to have corrected the hazard. 122 The municipality's duty is
115 132 Colo. 374, 288 P.2d 349 (1955).
116 Id. at 377, 288 P.2d at 351.
117 See text at note 65 supro.
11 C'ty and County of Denver v. Magivney, 44 Cola. 157, 161, 96 Pac. 1002, 1004 (1908).
119 Beezley v. Olsan, 129 Colo. 406, 270 P.2d 758 (1954) where the court said that the presence of
snow or ice on a sidewalk was not actionable unless it had sufficiently accumulated so as to cause
one to fall and that the accumulation hord existed long enough for the city to have had constructive
notice; W. T. Grant Co. v. Cosady, 117 Colo. 405, 188 P.2d 881 (1948); City and County of Denver v.
Coton, 108 Colo. 170, 114 P.2d 553 (1941) (one justice dissenting) where the court said a city was not
to be held as strictly for such accumulations in a cross walk as for those an a sidewalk; City of
Alamosa v. Johnson, 99 Colo. 134, 60 P.2d 1087 (1936) (must be an accumulation).
120 City of Grand Junction v. Eichelberger, 138 Colo. 479, 334 P.2d 1095 (1959) where melting snow
from a sloping driveway ran onto a depressed sidewalk and refroze each night; Wold v. City of
Boulder, 91 Colo. "4, 9 P.2d 931 (1932) where the city was given judgment when the paintiff failed
to show that the hazard was a recurring one; City and County of Denver v. Willson, 81 Colo. 134,
254 Pac. 153 (1927) where water draining onto sidewalk from a downspout was held to be an effec-
tive artificial cause.
121 See text at note 126 infra.
122 E.g., Beezley v. Olson, 129 Colo. 406, 270 P.2d 758 (1954) (dictum); City and County of Denver
v. Dugdale, 127 Colo. 329, 256 P.2d 898 (1953) (two justices dissenting) (two days not sufficient
time); City of Sterling v. Ancioux, 112 Colo. 381, 149 P.2d 174 (1944) where city was held liable
despite elapse of only a few hours where it was shown that the city's street washer was responsible;
City and County of Denver v. Caton, 108 Colo. 170, 114 P.2d 553 (1941) (one justice dissenting) (judg-
ment for plaintiff despite possibility that only two days had elapsed); City of Boulder v. Niles, 9
Colo. 415, 12 Pac. 632 (1886) (question of fact as to whether five days sufficient); City of Denver v.
Solomon, 2 Colo. App. 534, 31 Pac. 507 (1892).
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not changed despite the fact that the U.S. Government owned the
abutting property and had constructed the sidewalk, '1 2 3 or that the
abutting property was a vacant lot.'2 4 The pedestrian himself must
have used increased care under conditions of increased hazard. 25
The duty of abutting property owners is well phrased in City
of Denver v. Utzler 2 where it was said:
It is the duty of a city to maintain its streets and high-
ways in a reasonably good condition for ordinary travel by
persons using due care and prudence in the use of the same.
Citizens owning property bordering upon the street have
not the right to place obstructions upon such portions of
the street as are intended to be used as a travelway, and the
city has no right to suffer this to be done. Where it is per-
mitted, and one lawfully upon the street and using due care,
is injured because of such obstruction, and without fault
upon his part, the city is liable. The city is not liable, how-
ever, except in cases where an obstruction is the proximate
cause of the injury, and it is not liable if the party injured
could have avoided the injury by the exercise of reasonable
and ordinary care and prudence.
127
It should be noted that liability is imputed to the abutting own-
er only for obstructions and artificial causes for which he is respon-
sible. 12 At common law the owner of property abutting sidewalks
owes no duty to keep the walk free of ice and snow accumulating
from natural causes.'2 9 Civil liability is not imposed upon the prop-
erty owner for failure to remove snow even where the municipality
has a penal ordinance requiring property owners to promptly re-
move it from the abutting walks. 30 Failure of the owner to prompt-
ly remove the snow or ice does not, however, give the city the right
to wait to determine if the owner is going to remove the ice as re-
quired."'
Other cases involving miscellaneous thoroughfare accidents
have held that the municipality is not liable for accidents to a spec-
123 City of Denver v. Human, 9 Colo. App. 144, 47 Pac. 911 (1897); City of Denver v. Hickey, 9
Colo. App. 137, 47 Pac. 908 (1897).
124 City of Denver v. Rhodes, 24 Colo. App. 114, 131 Pac. 786 (1913).
125 E.g., City of Denver v. Hubbard, 29 Colo. 529, 69 Pac. 508 (1902). A minor question is often
raised in "icy sidewalk" cases as to whether the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence for
choosing the route where the accident occurred rather than a safer route. The usual result is that
when the icy condition is generally wide-spread, with little difference in the alternate routes, the
plaintiff is not charged at low with contributory negligence. Typical views on this point are found in
City and County of Denver v. Hudson, 91 Colo. 87, 12 P.2d 344 (1932) (icy sidewalk). City of High-
lands v. Raine, 23 Colo. 295, 47 Pac. 283 (1896) (judgment for plaintiff) involved an accident on an
icy sidewalk with one long section tipped steeply to one side. When it is considered that the plaintiff
could have easily detoured around this extro-hazardous section, it is difficult to distinguish this case
from City of Colorado Springs v. Phillips, 76 Colo. 257, 230 Pac. 617 (1924) (judgment for plaintiff
reversed). In Phillips, the court said it was the duty of the plaintiff's decedent to detour around a
known hazard. See generally Restatement, Torts 11 473-74 (1934); Prosser, Torts 288-89 (2d ed. 1955).
For typical views of the court on contributory negligence, see City of Victor v. Carbis, 59 Colo.
92, 147 Pac. 331 (1915) where the plaintiff was injured while running across slick steel door imbedded
in sidewalk; City of Colorado City v. Hunt, 56 Cola. 336, 138 Pac. 24 (1914) where plaintiff delib-
erately attempted to leap across an excavation which she could have easily avoided by choosing an
alternate route.
126 38 Colo. 300, 88 Pac. 143 (1906).
127 Id. at 303-04, 88 Pac. at 144-45. Accord, Goede v. City of Colorado Springs, 200 Fed. 99 (D.
Colo. 1912). See generally Prosser, Torts 428-29 (2d ed. 1955).
128 Cases cited in note 120 supra. Accord, Sill v. Lewis. 344 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1959) (city not a
party); City of Denver v. Murray, 18 Colo. App. 142, 70 Pac. 440 (1902) (obstruction in street);
Restatement, Torts § 368, comment e (1934). See generally Prosser, Torts 430 (2d ed. 1955).
129 Goede v. City of Colorado Springs, 200 Fed. 99 (D. Colo. 1912); Beezley v. Olson, 129 Colo.
406, 270 P.2d 758 (1954); Swenson v. La Shell, 118 Colo. 333, 195 P.2d 385 (1948); W. T. Grant Co.
v. Casady, 117 Colo. 405, 188 P.2d 881 (1948). Accord, Restatement, Torts 9 363 (1934).
130 Beezley v. Olson, supra note 129; W. T. Grant Co. v. Cosady, supro note 129.
131 City and County of Denver v. Brubaker, 97 Colo. 501, 51 P.2d 352 (1935).
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tator viewing an illegal exhibition on a city street; 132 nor is it liable
when a child playing around a street-side evacuation is burned by a
warning flare-pot.13 3 One case held that it is the city's duty to keep
and maintain all of a sidewalk, and that the public has the right to
expect that the entire walk is reasonably safe for travel. 134 The
same principles have been applied also to streets.
1 35
NEGLIGENCE IN MINISTERIAL FUNCTIONS
Damages to citizens caused by flood waters or in the city's
failure either to provide or to adequately size sewer systems have
initiated several Colorado cases. As mentioned earlier, the munici-
pality is not liable for its failure or refusal to engage in a ministerial
function; it is only when the city has embarked into one of these
functions that it becomes bound for its negligence.136  Thus it has
been held that:
[A] municipality is under no legal duty to construct
drainage sewers; that no liabiliy attaches because of the
adoption of a defective plan of drainage because it is there-
by exercising a governmental function; but that, in the con-
struction and maintenance of sewers, a municipality acts in
its ministerial capacity and is liable for negligence in con-
nection therewith.
137
The distinction must be drawn between non-liability for adop-
tion of a defective plan and liability for construction of a defective
sewer line. Where the general scheme in its entirety is inadequate
or incorrectly designed, the city is acting in its governmental capa-
city and as such is immune. It is when, and only when, the city
is negligent in the performance of the actual construction or main-
tenance of the sewer itself-whether it is adequate or not-that
liability attaches. This is a fine distinction, but it does exist never-
theless. This distinction is well illustrated in those cases 138 dealing
with flooding from defective sewers.
A few cases were found involving flooding of the plaintiff's
property because of improper provisions taken by third parties us-
ing city streets and acting under a license from the municipality.
City of Denver v. Bayer,139 although not an action for tort, has been
the keystone case for those third-party cases which did sound in
tort. The court in the Bayer case said:
[W]e think that for injuries caused by a reasonable
change or improvement of the street by the council, in a
careful manner, the abutting owner should not recover.
140
132 Noble v. City of Canon City, 73 Colo. 374, 215 Pac. 867 (1923).
133 City of Grand Junction v. Lashmett, 126 Colo. 256, 247 P.2d 909 (1952).
134 City of Denver v. Stein, 25 Colo. 125, 53 Pac. 283 (1898). No defense that there was ample
room for pedestrians to travel along the safe portion.
135 Arps v. City and County of Denver, 82 Colo. 189, 257 Pac. 1094 (1927); City of Pueblo v
Smith, 3 Colo. App. 386, 33 Pac. 685 (1893). Compare Thunborg v. City of Pueblo, 45 Colo. 337, 101
Pac. 399 (1909), affirming 18 Colo. App. 80, 70 Pac. 148 (1902).
136 See text at note 24 supra.
137 City and County of Denver v. Mason, 88 Colo. 294, 295, 295 Pac. 788, 789 (1931). Cf., Malvernia
Inv. Co. v. City of Trinidad, 123 Colo. 394, 229 P.2d 945 (1951) (not bound to keep water off below-
grade lots); City of Boulder v. Fowler, 11 Colo. 396, 18 Pac. 337 (1888) (below-grade lot); City of
Denver v. Copelfi, 4 Colo. 25 (1877) (dictum); Daniels v. City of Denver, 2 Colo. 669 (1875) (below-
grade lot); Aicher v. City of Denver, 10 Colo. App. 413, 52 Pac. 86 (1897).
138 City and County of Denver v. Mason, supra note 137; City of Denver v. Rhodes, 9 Colo. 554,
13 Pac. 729 (1886) (city bound to keep sewers up to original capacity); City of Denver v. Capelli,
supra note 137 (dictum) (citizens have right to expect that sewers will remain open).
139 7 Colo. 113, 2 Pac. 6 (1883). Plaintiff was suing city for damages to his rights of entry to his
property caused when a railroad was granted an easement along a street by the city.
140 Id. ot 125, 2 Pac. at 13.
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and, the court further said:
If the railroad company disobey the law in building or
operating its road, the city is no more responsible therefor
than it would be for a tort of the private individual .... 141
These quotations from Bayer effectively summarize the posi-
tion taken by Colorado and have been cited for this principle in
those cases142 involving such an issue.
Cardiff Light & Water Co. v. Taylor143 was an action against the
water company and City of Glenwood Springs for damages incurred
by the plaintiff from a leaking water main belonging to both de-
fendants. The city owned the local water system and also furnished
water to its co-defendant for resale in a nearby town. The city was
held liable despite its contention that the contract with the water
company was ultra vires.14 4  The obvious distinction between this
case and those discussed immediately above is that here the city was
a party to the negligence.
141 Id. at 127, 2 Pac. at 14.
142 Luxford v. City and County of Denver, 65 Colo. 355, 176 Pac. 833 (1918) where a railroad em-
bankment across the end of the street for thirty years diverted flood waters onto the'plaintiff's land
for the first time; Sorensen v. Town of Greeley, 10 Colo. 369, 15 Pac. 803 (1887) where the building
of a railroad embankment across a street made it necessary for the plaintiff to go to considerable
expense to replace his irrigation water supply ditch; Town of Idaho Springs v. Filteau, 10 Colo. 105,
14 Pac. 48 (1887) (plaintiff's property damaged by leaking of mining company's flume in street);
Town of Idaho Springs v. Woodward, 10 Colo. 104, 14 Pac. 49 (1887) (same facts as Filteau).
14373 Colo. 566, 216 Pac. 711 (1923).
144 Ultra vires has been raised as a defense in a few other cases. Mill v. City of Fort Collins, 106
Cola. 229, 104 P.2d 143 (1940) (dictum) whore the court said that even if a contract was ultra vires,
if the city had received a benefit from it, the city would be estopped from pleading ultra vires as a
defense; Town of Idaho Springs v. Filteau, 10 Colo. 105, 14 Pac. 48 (1887) (not liable for negligence
of other party to ultra vires contract with city); Town of Idaho Springs v. Woodward, 10 Colo. 104,
14 Pac. 49 (1887) (same as Filteau).
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Flood control projects engaged in by a municipality have re-
sulted in what appears at first glance to be inconsistent results.
These cases can be distinguished however by careful analysis of the
precise questions presented upon appeal. Three cases dealing with
separate injuries to adjacent land owners by the same flood ended
in completely opposite results although the same fact situation was
involved in all three cases. The three plaintiffs owned separate
farming tracts just outside the corporate limits of Denver. These
tracts, all below the historical high-water mark of the Platte river,
were inundated by flood waters which rolled through a break in the
river dike protecting their property. The break in the dike had been
purposely left over a weekend by city employees engaged in re-
placing a sewer drain through the city-owned dike. The flash flood
struck a few hours after the city employees quit work, and appar-
ently without advance warning.
The first of these cases145 ended in victory for the plaintiff who
had charged the city with negligence in the maintenance of the dike.
The second case146 resulted in victory for the city. The defense
raised by the city in the second case was that it had no duty to the
out-of-city plaintiff other than to refrain from increasing the hazard
of flooding to the plaintiff's land. The city argued that prior to the
erection of the dike, the plaintiff's land was subject to natural flood-
ing; and that the break in the dike had not increased the flood haz-
ard any more than if the dike had not been in existence. The court
agreed, and said that the city's duty was only to its inhabitants and
that the plaintiff had no right to rely upon the protection of the
municipally-owned dike. The court, in distinguishing the instant
case from the earlier parallel action, said that the previous case was
conducted upon the sole issue of negligence, whereas the instant
case was conducted solely upon the question of duty. "Whether
the contention made here might have been urged in the former case
• ..and, if so, what our decisions might have been ... we need not
now determine. ' 147 The third case 1 48 went exactly as had the second
since it, too, was founded upon the same defense.
McCord v. City of Pueblo149 and Stewart v. City of Pueblo
150
were parallel cases upon similar fact situations. In these cases, both
parties were inhabitants of Pueblo and it was shown that their
property was above the flood level of the Arkansas river. The city
had constructed levees upon both sides of the river brut had pur-
posely left a large gap through one of these levees. Judgments of
dismissal were reversed in favor of both plaintiffs in their suits for
damages to their properties from flood waters entering through the
wide gap.
In another case, 151 previously mentioned,152 the plaintiff's teen-
age daughter was drowned while wading in a knee-deep section of
the Platte river owned by the City and County of Denver. The girl
had drowned when she stepped into an unmarked underwater ex-
145 City and County of Denver v. Tolorico, 99 Colo. 178, 61 P.2d 1 (1936).
146 City and County of Denver v. Pilo, 102 Colo. 326, 79 P.2d 270 (1938).
147 Id. at 335-36, 79 P.2d at 274.
148 City and County of Denver v. Strafacia, 110 Colo. 14, 129 P.2d 674 (1942).
1495 Colo. App. 48, 36 Pac. 1109 (1894).
1505 Colo. App. 55, 36 Pac. 1111 (1894). See also, City and County of Denver v. Merchant's Biscuit
Co., 61 Colo. 238, 157 Pac. 842 (1916) (Act of God is valid defense).
151 City and County of Denver v. Stutman, 95 Colo. 165, 33 P.2d 1071 (1934).
152 See text at note 114 supra.
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cavation which the city had dredged in the river bottom for flood
control purposes. The city was held liable for its negligence in not
warning those who used the public property of the unmarked
hazard.
When the city establishes and maintains an area for dumping
waste materials, it is considered to be a corporate duty. The city
will therefore be liable for its negligence when a fire on such a
dump destroys private property adjacent to the dump.' 3 The city,
however, will not be liable for being unable to enforce a prohibition
against private citizens using privately-owned land for a dumping
ground.
154
It would have been of great interest to have compared cases
involving falls into unguarded but hidden pitfalls in city parks with
the cases previously discussed 55 involving falls into such hazards
in parkways. Unfortunately no case was uncovered dealing with
the former fact situation. Other cases, however, were found involv-
ing accidents in city parks. In general, it may be said that a city is
liable for its negligence in maintaining 15 6 or erecting 1' 7 equipment
in a public park. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed in a case
where the plaintiff's son had drowned in a city-operated swimming
pool where it was shown that the city's life guard had been absent
with the knowledge of the pool's manager. 158 The court felt that the
absence of the life guard was the proximate cause of the unfortun-
ate accident.
CITY EMPLOYEES PERFORMING THEIR DUTIES IN
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITIES
Many of the cases discussed so far have obviously involved the
negligence of an employee of a city. Most of these cases, however,
have resulted from an employee's negligent performance of a func-
tion which is clearly private or corporate. As may be expected,
where an attempt is made to establish a well-divided line between
those activities of a municipality which are immune from tort lia-
bility and those which are not, an area in which there is much un-
certainty has sprung up. This uncertainty has been pointed out in
several cases. In City and County of Denver v. Forster,"9 the plain-
tiff sought to recover for injuries received when he tripped over a
safety-zone marker imbedded in the street. The court, in reversing
the plaintiff's favorable verdict, said:
[TI he judgment is wrong, for in granting such powers
and authorizing such devices the defendant was acting in
its governmental rather than in its administrative capacity.
The construction and maintenance of the streets of a mun-
153 City of Denvor v. Dvis, 37 Colo. 370, 86 Pac. 1027 (1906). Accord, City of Denver v. Porter,
126 Fed. 293 (8th Cir. 1903).
154 City and County of Denver v. Ristau, 95 Colo. 118, 33 P.2d 387 (1934). Compare Esquibel v.
City and County of Denver, 112 Colo. 546, 151 P.2d 757 (1944) (attractive nuisance sole issue) where
the plaintiff was injured while climbing upon junked automobiles piled without authorization upon
city-owned land.
155 See text at note 109 supra.
156 Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567, 129 P.2d 110 (1942) (dictum); City of Fort Collins
v. Roten, 72 Colo. 182, 210 Pac. 326 (1922) (plaintiff while sliding lost his finger when projecting bolt
caught ring); City of Canon City v. Cox, 55 Colo. 264, 133 Pac. 1040 (1913) (defective playground
equipment) (court felt that $8,000 not excessive damages for loss of arm of seven year-old girl).
157 City of Denver v. Spencer, 34 Colo. 270, 82 P.2d 590 (1905) (stage in park collapsed).
158 City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 81 Colo. 246, 254 Poc. 1000 (1927).
159 89 Colo. 246, 1 P.2d 922 (1931).
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icipality has been often held by this court to be a corporate
matter for which liability may in proper cases be imposed,
but the making and enforcing of "ordinances regulating
the use of streets brings into exercise governmental and not
corporate powers ....
Similarly another case161 involving a close distinction between gov-
ernmental and corporate functions held that although a municipali-
ty was liable for the negligent operation of a public park, supervi-
sion of park activities is a governmental function.
Another case concerned with this "gray area" is City and Coun-
ty of Denver v. Maurer.162 City employees engaged in cleaning out
storm sewers in the downtown area had connected a fire hose and
laid it out across the sidewalk to the street. As the plaintiff ap-
proached the workmen, one of them pulled the hose and struck the
plaintiff with it. The city attempted to show that the activity was
one concerned with the public health and therefore governmental in
nature. The court refuted the argument of the city by saying:
[0] ften some detail in the performance of one class of
general duties partakes partly or wholly of the nature of
another class of general duties. Thus frequently details in
the performance of the general duty of caring for the
streets partake of the nature of duties performed in the
preservation of public health. It also appears that a muni-
cipality may be immune from negligence occurring in the
performance of a detail in one class of duties, while it
would be liable for negligence in the performance of a like
detail in another class; as, for instance, while it would not
be liable for the negligence of its firemen in stretching a
hose on a sidewalk while using it to put out a fire, it might
be liable for the negligence of employees stretching a hose
on the sidewalk while using it in the care of its streets.
163
It follows, therefore, that the flushing of that sewer,
though done to preserve health and comfort, was not done
primarily in the performance of the governmental duty re-
lating to the preservation of health, but was done in the dis-
charge of the general duty of caring for the streets .... 114
Dictum in another case1 65 indicated that a city might not be
liable for injuries suffered in a fall caused by stepping into a side-
walk depression used as a watering basin for a tree, if it could be
shown that the planting of the tree was part of an overall plan to
beautify the city.
160 Id. at 248, 1 P.2d at 923, quoting in part from Addington v. Town of Littleton, 50 Colo. 623,
115 Pac. 896 (1911) (city not liable for failure to enforce dog-leash ordinance).
161 Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567, 129 P.2d 110 (1942) where it was held that city
was not responsible for injuries of a skater inflicted by other skaters. The court, perhaps with tongue
in cheek, partially distinguished the instant case with City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 81 Colo. 246,
254 Pac. 1000 (1927), by saying that the cold water there might indicate that the city was at fault.
Yet, Swearingen did not hinge upon the coldness of the water, and the subject was hardly mentioned
there.
162 47 Colo. 209, 106 Pac. 875 (1910).
161 id. at 213, 106 Pac. at 876.
164 Id. at 214-15, 106 Pac. at 877.
165 Belcaro Realty Inv. Co. v. Norton, 103 Colo. 485, 87 P.2d 1114 (1939).
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It is well settled in Colorado that the failure of the city to en-
force an ordinance does not give rise to an action in tort.166 The
powers of a municipality which are of a public and general char-
acter are to be exercised by virtue of certain attributes of sovereign-
ty delegated to it by the state. These powers are for the welfare and
protection of the citizens, and no liability attaches for either non-
user or mis-user of these powers.
167
The municipality has a limited power to abate public nuis-
ances. 6 The abatement of such a nuisance is solely discretionary,
and the city has no duty imposed upon it to act. This nuisance,
however, must not be created or maintained by the express authori-
ty of the city, nor may it be the result of any act or omission in the
performance of a duty imposed upon the city.169 Should the city
declare that a privately owned building is a nuisance, and destroys
it on this ground, the city will be held liable should it be shown
that the offending building was not a nuisance in fact. The owner
of such a building will be given compensation, if not in damages
for the tort, then by virtue of the constitutional provision requiring
payment for the taking of private property for public use.
170
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS
The rule which determines the liability or non-liability
of a municipality in cases of this nature is the character of
the duty performed, rather than the department, officer, or
agent of the corporation by whom the duty is performed.
1 7'
The rule quoted has been substantially followed in Colorado for
many years. In distinguishing the "character of the duty per-
formed," language from the earliest 72 Colorado case' 73 concerned
with the issue of municipal tort immunity gives an excellent guide:
Courts have gone a long way in holding cities liable for
the negligent acts of their agents, and they are always hold-
en wherever the acts which are being done . . . are acts for
the benefit . .. of the individuals who are inhabitants of
the municipality. It is on this general principle that a city
is held liable for the care of its streets and sidewalks, for
negligence or carelessness in the construction of its sewers
and drains .... 174
Whenever we approach the other field, which only con-
cerns the exercise by the municipality of the judicial or
governmental authority which may have been the subject
of power granted, we find the cases almost universally
hold cities are not liable for injuries resulting from negli-
gent acts. The cases proceed on the hypothesis that acts of
166City and County of Denver v. Ristou, 95 Colo. 118, 33 P.2d 387 (1934); City and County of
Denver v. Forster, 89 Colo. 246, 1 P.2d 922 (1931); Addington v. Town of Littleton, 50 Colo. 623, 115
Pac. 896 (1911). See also, Irving v. City of Highlands, 11 Colo. App. 363, 53 Poc. 234 (1898) (no tort
liability for refusing to issue city license).
167 Veraguth v. City of Denver, 19 Colo. App. 473, 76 Poc. 539 (1904).
168 Echave v. City of Grand Junction, 118 Colo. 165, 193 P.2d 277 (1948). Cf., Atkinson v. City and
County of Denver, 118 Colo. 322, 195 P.2d 977 (1948) (city officers shot "plaintiff's" squirrels).
169 City and County of Denver v. Ristau, 95 Colo. 118, 33 P.2d 387 (1934).
170 McMahon v. City of Telluride, 79 Colo. 281, 244 Poc. 1017 (1926).
171 City of Denver v. Davis, 37 Colo. 370, 374, 86 Pac. 1027, 1028 (1906).
172 Up to this time, every pertinent Colorado case on the appellate level had been concerned either
with some defect in a thoroughfare or with flooding from a sewer or river.
173 McAuliffe v. City of Victor, 15 Colo. App. 337, 62 Poc. 231 (1900) where the plaintiff, while
confined in the jail, was injured in a fire started by another prisoner.
174 Id. at 338-39, 62 Poc. at 231.
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this nature are for the benefit of the public as well as of
particular citizens, and that they are done in a public ca-
pacity, and . . . the city is not responsible for the negligent
performance of such public duties.
1'7 5
It is of interest to note that Mr. President Judge Bissell, in the
instant case, reluctantly granted immunity to the city for its alleged
negligence in permitting a drunk prisoner to set fire to his jail cell
thereby injuring the plaintiff who had been confined nearby. Mr.
President Judge Bissell cast the lot of Colorado into its present
course when he said in closing:
If the question was an open one, I might be inclined
to hold the city responsible. The whole current, and in
fact, the almost unanimous decision, of the courts on the
question forecloses our judgment, and compels us to ex-
onerate the municipality .... 176
Meek v. City of Loveland1'77 was a stirring case in which the
plaintiff sued the city and its mayor, chief of police, physician and
one of its police officers along with the county physician.'78 Several
charges'7 9 were made, with the chief one of these being that the
plaintiff's leg had been negligently amputated by the county phy-
sician. The city and its officers were charged with liability on
grounds that the amputation was the proximate result of their forci-
ble removal of the plaintiff to the county farm. Prior to the offering
of evidence in the trial below, the court granted the city's motion
for dismissal as to the city despite objections by the plaintiff. The
Colorado Supreme Court gave only token notice to the dismissal of
the city, and merely states without discussion that the city could
not be charged with the torts of its officers. The gist of the instant
case was that the city's doctor and chief of police had acted at their
peril, and they were liable for the negligence of the county physi-
cian. This case viewed in the light of the subsequent cases 80 must
be considered as inferentially holding that the municipality is not
liable for the wrongful acts of its officials and agents whether such
acts are within or without their scope of authority.
City and County of Denver v. Mason'"' involved a routine com-
plaint alleging negligence by the city in installing and permitting
an undersized drain to remain in service. The case is of little sig-
175 Id. at 339, 62 Pac. at 231.
176 Id. at 341, 62 Pac. at 232.
177 85 Colo. 346, 276 Pac. 30 (1929). The plaintiff was shot in the knee by the police officer as the
plaintiff fled following an alleged attempt to burglarize a store. The bullet was removed at the hos-
pital and the plaintiff was taken home. A few days later, city physician and chief of police forcibly
removed the plaintiff from his home and took him to the county farm where the amputation was per-
formed. The plaintiff was confined for seven weeks before he was arraigned on the day before he
was released from the county form. These charges were finally dismissed for lack of evidence in a
subsequent appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court. Plaintiff then brought this action.
178 The case was dismissed as against the mayor and the policeman, both of whom had died prior
to the trial.
179 Plaintiff's complaint charged (1) conspiracy to imprison him, (2) imprisonment to conceal the
wrongful acts and to protect the city from liability, and (3) liability for the negligently-performed
amputation. The first two of these were dismissed by the Supreme Court, and the third charge re-
manded for new trial.
180 E.g., McIntosh v. City and County of Denver, 98 Colo. 403, 55 P.2d 1337 (1936) (discussed in
text at note 8,5 infra. Compare Town of Colorado City v. Liafe, 28 Colo. 468, 65 Pac. 630 (1901)
where plaintiff was successful in recovering damages against the city caused when city official ordered
him to work in an area known to be hazardous by the official but not by plaintiff; with City of
Greeley v. Foster, 32 Colo. 292, 75 Pac. 351 (1904) where plaintiff was denied relief for injuries
received when foreman ordered plaintiff to work in area which plaintiff knew to be hazardous.
181 88 Colo. 294, 295 Pac. 788 (1931). The plaintiff must have had the patience of Job, for his
property had been damaged in three consecutive years, and the under-sized drain was still in place




nificance but for the language used by the court in affirming the
plaintiff's judgment. It was said:
Ordinary common sense always points the way to jus-
tice. . . . Under such circumstances, to permit the city to
escape liability under the cloak of the exercise of a gov-
ernmental function would be unwarranted and unjust. 8 2
The court during the same year affirmed judgment for the city in
a case involving a collision with a fire department vehicle.18 The
court held that the operation of a fire department was a govern-
mental function and thereby immune from liability for the wrong-
ful or negligent acts of the department or its employees in the per-
formance of their duties. It is interesting to note, however, that
without apparent necessity, the court concluded by saying:
We cannot interfere with this judgment without over-
ruling previous decisions of this cou:t and our Court of Ap-
peals, and this we are not disposed to do, as they are in line
with many decisions in this country.8 4
In an action for malicious prosecution,'8 5 the court said that a
municipality, being an artificial being, as such could not have a
malicious intent. The court clearly laid out the rules of law per-
taining to municipal employees which had been previously applied
in Meek. The court said that officers of a city were not regarded as
agents of the city when their duties were of a public nature, since
the performance of such duties was in the interest of the public.
Should the acts of these officers be wrongful, responsibility would
rest upon the officer alone. The court concluded by saying:
The city, in its corporate capacity, could receive no
benefit from the wrongful acts ... and it is only when it
acts through its agents in its corporate capacity that it is
answerable to a person injured through the negligence or
misdirection of its servants, and this cloak of protection is
182 Id. at 299, 295 Pac. at 790.183 Moses v. City and County of Denver, 89 Colo. 609, 5 P.2d 581 (1931). This problem is only of
academic interest now, for Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-10-1 (1953) permits suit to be brought for "any injuryto the person or property of another . . . caused by the tortious operation of a motor vehicle by a
state, county, municipal or quasi-municipal police, fire or health department while engaged in the line
of duty .... o"
164 Id. at 612-13, 5 P.2d at 583.
185 McIntosh v. City and County of Denver, 98 Colo. 403, 55 P.2d 1337 (1936). Compare Walker v.Tucker, 131 Colo. 198, 280 P.2d 649 (1955) (false imprisonment suit against town marshal) where
judgment for the plaintiff was reversed and dismissed since the defendant "was acting in his capacityas a peace officer" for the "benefit of the public." The court further said that the town could not beliable because the defendant was not acting as an agent of the town.
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not withdrawn, even for the benefit of an injured person,
when the city acts in its governmental capacity.1
86
The plaintiff in Barker v. City and County of Denver87 was unsuc-
cessful in his suit against the city for negligence in putting out a fire
at his home. The fire department for some undisclosed reason con-
nected its hoses to a fire plug several blocks away instead of using
a plug less than a block from the burning house. The fire con-
tinued unabated while the firemen sought additional hoses when
it was discovered that they did not have a sufficient number on
hand to span the longer distance. The court held that this was the
performance of a governmental function and the city was therefore
immune from liability.
Schwalb v. Connely s88 was a joint action against the manager
of Denver General Hospital and the City and County of Denver for
negligence in performing an autopsy by mistake on the body of the
plaintiff's husband. Through a mix-up by one of the hospital's
nurses, the body of the plaintiff's husband instead of another body
was tagged for delivery to the coroner's laboratory. The court rest-
ed the immunity of the city upon grounds of the general duty for
the "preservation of the public health." The case was dismissed
against the other defendants since the nurse who had actually made
the mistake was not joined. The court held that the doctrine of re-
spondent superior was not applicable to public officials and the em-
ployees under them unless these officials had failed to use ordinary
care in selecting the employees, or had either directed or authorized
the wrong, or else had been negligent in their supervision. It is sub-
mitted that this case could have been found in favor of the city on
grounds quite independent of municipal immunity. "
Until 1952, nothing positive had been said by the Colorado
courts about limiting the scope of municipal tort immunity. A few
cases, such as Mason and Moses discussed above, perhaps hinted
that the court might in some instances like to impose liability upon
municipal governments, but there is nothing to this effect that one
can point a finger to as a definite sign of a trend. Interesting lan-
guage appears in a case decided in 1952.1"10 Although the entire case
is concerned with an action to cancel a deed granted to the State
Highway Department, and is therefore dictum in the instant dis-
cussion, the tone of the language used therein is of great interest.
Mr. Justice Holland, in reversing judgment for the state, said:
[S] urely it cannot be contended that under our system
of government it was not intended that the judicial branch
of the government stand open as a haven for the protection
of any citizens whose rights have been invaded, whether
it be by an individual or by either of the other branches
of our government. Our courts are to decide the rights of
citizens, whether it be by an individual or by either of the
186 Id. at 406, 55 P.2d at 1338.
187 113 Colo. 543, 160 P.2d 363 (1945).
188 116 Colo. 195, 179 P.2d 667 (1947).
189 Prosser, Torts 44 (2d ed. 1955) in note 67 says that recovery for the mishandling of bodies is
usually denied for mere negligence, as aggravated conduct is lacking. But see Restatement, Torts §
368, comment a (1934) which says, "The right to maintain an action for intentional interference with
the body exists although there was no intent to do a tortious act, as where . . . a surgeon performs
an autopsy mistakenly believing that he is privileged to do so. On the other hand, there is no right to
maintain an action for mere negligence in dealing with the body."
190 Boxberger v. State Hwy. Dep't., 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952).
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other branches of our government. It is with pride that we
say . . . that our courts respond immediately to rescue a
citizen from those holding him under asserted governmen-
tal authority and to give him relief as against the sovereign
power if the circumstances warrant. . . . The rights of a
citizen remain the same whether they collide with an in-
dividual or the government .... 191
In 1957, the Colorado Supreme Court took the next step in re-
ducing sovereign immunity. In Boxberger, the court was assisted
in reaching their decision by the fact that the state, did not stand
to lose any funds of the state treasury should the decision go against
it. In Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture,192
the plaintiff was suing the state for breach of contract. There was
no question but that the state treasury would be reduced should the
plaintiff here win. The possible loss of state funds was somewhat
ameliorated, however, by the disclosure that the legislature had
already appropriated the entire contract sum, and these funds had
been set aside for that express purpose. Mr. Justice Sutton, in
speaking for the entire court, gave expression to what may have
been in the minds of several of his predecessors when he said:
To hold that the state may enter into a contract by
which the other party is compelled to expend large sums
• . . to enable it to perform its obligation, and then arbi-
trarily repudiate the contract . . . would be to sanction the
highest type of governmental tyranny.193
In discussing the background of sovereign immunity, Mr. Justice
Sutton continued by saying:
The doctrine of soverign immunity from suit has a his-
torical basis steeped in antiquity and antedating the estab-
lishment of any organized government on this continent.
... The original basis for the existence of the doctrine ...
was that the king or sovereign could do no wrong, was con-
sidered untouchable and above the law. Later in the de-
mocracies it was recognized that to permit suits against the
state would result in the depletion of its treasury and of tax
funds necessary for the operation of the government on be-
half of all its citizens. The doctrine . . . is also based upon
the proposition that since a democratic state represents the
people an action against it is in effect suing oneself, which
is a legalistic anomaly.194
He concluded by saying, "All that we are holding, and can hold
here, is that as to the contract entered into between the parties to
this action, the state has waived its immunity from suit." 19 Mr.
Chief Justice Moore, in his concurring opinion, said: "Whatever
may have been the rule heretofore, I am of the firm opinion that
any citizen may resort to litigation to protect his life, liberty or
property even though his adversary be the sovereign state of Colo-
rado." 196
191 Id. at 441, 250 P.2d at 1008.
192 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).
193 Id. at 22, 314 P.2d at 280.
194 Id. at 24, 314 P.2d at 281.
195 Id. at 25, 314 P.2d at 281.
196 Id. at 31, 314 P.2d at 284.
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A few months later in an action 197 filed to recover monies paid
under protest to the state, Mr. Justice Hall quoted with special em-
phasis that part of Boxberger 98 concerning the rights of a citizen
as against the state. At the same time, he expressed what may very
likely become a classical phrase in Colorado's legal philosophy. He
said: "In Colorado 'sovereign immunity' may be a proper subject
for discussion by students of mythology, but finds no haven or ref-
uge in this Court."199
These three decisions, Boxberger, Ace Flying Service and Brush
Racing Ass'n-all within five years of each other-are certainly
food for thought. They are particularly significant in that all dealt
with that most sacred cow of all-immunity of the state-and not
with the lesser degree of immunity granted to municipalities, which
already are considered split personalities. These three decisions are
significant in another direction also. Boxberger was highly quali-
fied and limited in its extent; and it is apparent from the words
used, that the court held it to be very important that state funds
would remain untouched even if the plaintiff was successful. In
Ace Flying Service a new plateau was reached when the plaintiff
was awarded state funds-but these were funds already appropriat-
ed and set aside for the particular contract being sued upon. A still
higher plateau was attained in Brush Racing Ass'n where the funds
recovered by the plaintiff were not only claimed by the state as its
own; but also these funds were certainly not appropriated by the
legislature, and may well even have been considered in drawing up
the state's budget.
Although it has no direct bearing on the subject of municipal
immunity, it should be noted that five months after Brush Racing
Ass'n, the now-famous Merris200 decision was handed down censur-
ing the practice of municipal courts imposing criminal penalties
without also granting constitutional protections, and also narrowing
the penal powers of municipalities.
These decisions against the state, coupled with Merris, all help
paint the background to the two latest Colorado decisions on the
question of the immunity of the municipalities. City and Countyl of
Denver v. Austria20 1 involved an action brought by the plaintiff
197 Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, Inc., 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957).
198 Boxberger v. State Hwy. Dep't, 126 Colo. 438, 441, 250 P.2d 1007, 1008 (1952) (pertinent part
of quotation in text at note 191 supra).
199 Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, Inc., 136 Colo. 279, 284, 316 P.2d 582, 585
(1957).
200 Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
201 136 Colo. 454, 318 P.2d 1103 (1957).
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seeking to recover for injuries received when he tripped over a
temporary fence erected across the steps to the city and county
building. The steps were unlighted and no warning of the hazard
was posted. The barrier had been erected by city employees en-
gaged in removing the annual Christmas lighting exhibits. The city
unsuccessfully contended that it was immune on grounds that every
activity connected with the municipal building was a governmental
function. The course of future decisions is perhaps charted by what
was said in this case. Mr. Justice Holland, in championing the
cause of the plaintiff, said:
[T] he general trend of decisions is to restrict the doc-
trine of governmental immunity and nonliability and con-
strue the doctrine strictly against the city.
[W] e are astonished at how far afield counsel for the
city have gone in taking the position that the city is im-mune .... 202_
If the city sees fit to carry on other activities, not neces-
sary in the performance of its governmental functions, then
it assumes the risk of liability for its torts in the conduct
or operation of such activities..
2 0 3
City and County of Denver v. Madison2"'14 is perhaps the most
important case concerning municipal immunity to be considered in
Colorado's legal history. The issues are more clearly drawn and
sharply presented than in any other previous case. Although the
issue of failure to promptly notify the city was raised as one of the
city's multiple defenses, 20 5 the court chose to limit the questions be-
fore it to two inter-related issues: (1) was the city liable for the
negligence of the hospital's employees, and (2) did the negligent
acts arise out of the performance of a governmental function? The
issue of whether the operation of the hospital was a governmental
function was obviously the key question.
Mr. Justice Moore, in delivering the majority opinion, felt that
Schwalb206 had established that operation of a hospital by a mun-
icipality was a governmental function. Mr. Justice Moore ruled
that the Ace Flying Service, Brush Racing Ass'n, and Stone2 0 7 cases
pertained solely to contract actions; and that only through legisla-
tive action, could the cloak of tort immunity be lifted.
The three dissenting members of the court unfortunately split
into two independent camps. Mr. Justice Frantz, with Mr. Justice
Hall concurring, lashed out at the entire concept of sovereign im-
munity-"a doctrine . . . that should have died aborning. '2 - 18 In an
eloquent discussion of the historical background of the rule, he at-
tacked it as an anachronism, and, almost bitterly, said, "This court
has held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is no longer in
202 Id. at 456, 318 P.2d at 1103.
203 Id. at 457, 318 P.2d at 1103.
204 12 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 238 (1960) (4.3 decision). The plaintiff's six month-old daughter
was undergoing charity treatment at Denver General Hospital. A steam vaporizer being used in the
treatment sprayed hot steam over the baby while she was unattended. The resulting burns were
alleged to have caused the infant to become blind, deaf, lame and mentally-defective.
205 Notice of the claim was not filed until nine years after the tragic accident. The facts of the
accident were proved, however, by introduction of the pertinent hospital records by stipulation of both
parties.
206 Schwalb v. Connely, 116 Colo. 195, 179 P.2d 667 (1947). See text at note 188 supra.
2017 Stone v. Currigan, 138 Colo. 442, 334 P.2d 740 (1959).
208 City and County of Denver v. Madison, 12 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 238, 241 (1960).
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effect in Colorado. At least I thought that the axe truly had been
laid to the root of the tree."
20 9
Mr. Justice Doyle's solitary dissent succinctly sketched the legal
history of sovereign immunity from common law days to modern
times, with references to many leading cases and texts to support
his firm conviction that municipal functions should be narrowly
classified as governmental in nature. He felt that the root of the
problem in determining which category a municipal function prop-
erly belonged was the ever-increasing assumption of activities by
municipalities. This confusion could be eliminated, Mr. Justice
Doyle said, by confining the category of governmental functions to
those acts historically performed by a municipality. Thus, it would
follow that, when a municipality took over a service ordinarily per-
formed by private enterprise, the assumption of such an activity
would show an intention to give a right of action for negligence in
this enterprise. It is submitted that Mr. Justice Doyle's dissent is a
model judicial opinion and should be read as a concise, but inclu-
sive, sketch of the entire field.
It should be noted that both the majority members of the court
and Mr. Justice Doyle felt that only by legislative action could
sovereign immunity be abandoned. Mr. Justice Frantz and Mr. Jus-
tice Hall chose to advocate the overturning of the doctrine by
straight-forward judicial action. It would appear that Madison has
abruptly halted the progressive crumbling of the walls of sovereign
immunity.
CONCLUSION
The tower of sovereign immunity may topple in time if the
courts continue to whittle slowly away at its supports. It is sub-
mitted, however, that action by the legislature would be preferable.
The state legislature should make a complete appraisal of the doc-
trine, examine what other states have done, and then enact legisla-
tion which will correct the inequities of the archaic doctrine. Full
protection should be given to all levels of government as far as
necessary to insure the continued guidance of the over-all policies.
The public should not object to complete immunity for the use of,
or failure to use, discretionary powers; nor would there be much
objection to immunity being continued in the public safety areas,
e.g., fire and police activities. There is no reason, however, for the
protection presently granted to the municipalities where their of-
ficials and servants exceed their powers such as in the McAuliffe210
case, or in the McMahon2 1, Meek,212 and McIntosh-1 3 cases. Throw-
ing open the door would not result in the always-feared avalanche
of cases, for adequate safeguards would still remain in our normal
judicial processes and rules; but the citizen would thereby be given
adequate protection of his rights.
Viewing the entire problem abstractly, there is no logical rea-
son, aside from the well-worn but nebulous rule of stare decisis,
why a private citizen should not be permitted to sue freely any gov-
209 Id. at 243.
210 McAuliffe v. City of Victor, 15 Colo. App. 337, 62 Poc. 231 (1900). See text at note 173 supra.
211 McMahon v. City of Telluride, 79 Colo. 281, 244 Pac. 1017 (1926). See text at note 170 supro.
212 Meek v. City of Loveland, 85 Colo. 346, 276 Poc. 30 (1929). See text at note 177 supro.




ernmental body from the highest to the lowest tier. Why should a
citizen who is guaranteed all kinds of rights of liberty and private
freedom by his governments, be prevented from the rightful and
lawful enforcement of these rights when the offender is one of these
same governments? Is this not a mockery of our constitutional
rights and protections? It is hoped that soon the governmental im-
munity shield will be discarded; and that it may truly be said that
the subject of sovereign immunity is only for discussion by students
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